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Louise B61anger-Hardy*

Thresholds of Actionable Mental Harm
in Negligence: A Policy-Based
Analysis

Common law courts, in Canada and elsewhere, currently insist on proof of a
recognizable psychiatric illness (RPI) before granting damages to plaintiffs
seeking compensation for stand-alone mental harm caused by negligent acts.
This article argues that the time has come to revisit this well-entrenched principle.
The inquiry focuses specifically on the policy concerns underlying the current
rule. As a first step, policy considerations for and against limiting the extent of
actionable mental harm are canvassed and assessed. The author concludes that
some of the perceived advantages of the RPI rule, in particular predictability, are
debatable and that insistence on the traditional formula raises issues of access
and fairness. As a second step, the option of eliminating all thresholds is examined
and rejected in favour of a "no compensation for mere upsets" threshold. The
author suggests that this threshold will allow courts to strike the correct balance
between deterring legal actions based on "mere upsets" of life and recognizing the
legitimacy of "mid-spectrum" mental harm, whether psychiatric, psychological, or
emotional in nature.
A ce jour, au Canada et ailleurs, les tribunaux de common law insistent sur la
preuve d'un prejudice psychiatrique reconnu (PPR) lorsqu'il s'agit dindemniser
les demandeurs ayant subi un pr6judice purement moral causd par la n6gligence
d'autrui. Cet article suggbre qu'il est temps de revoir ce principe bien 6tabli. La
d6marche est centree sur les considdrations de politique gdndrale qui soustendent I'6tat actuel du droit. En premier lieu, I'auteure examine les questions
de politique pour et contre la ndcessit6 de limiter I'dtendue du pr6judice moral
indemnisable. Elle conclut que les a vantages associds &la r~gle PPR ne sont pas
probants et que le fait d'insister sur un tel palier soul~ve des questions d'acc~s
et d'dquitd. En deuxibme lieu, Iauteure se penche sur la possibilit6 d'6liminer
tous les paliers, mais cette option est rejet6e en faveur d'un palier fondd sur la
notion de < non-indemnisation pour simple contrari6te .. Selon lauteure, cette
solution permettra aux tribunaux de pr6venir les actions juridiques fonddes sur
les << simples ddsagrdments de la vie - tout en reconnaissant la ldgitimit6 du
prejudice moral sous toutes ses formes, qu'il soit psychiatrique, psychologique
ou 6motionnel.
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Introduction
Tort law has always viewed mental harm with caution, not to say
scepticism. This devaluation of injury to the mind can be attributed to
a number of intertwining causes including limited scientific and medical
knowledge about the functioning of the psyche,' conceptions of the mind/
body relationship inspired by Cartesian dualism, 2 prevalent assumptions

1. For a study of the evolution of medical knowledge, see, e.g., E Fuller Torrey & Judy Miller, The
Invisible Plague: The Rise of Mental Illnessfrom 1750 to the Present(New Jersey: Rutgers University
Press, 2001); Rhodri Hayward, "Medicine and the Mind" in Mark Jackson, ed, The Oxford Handbook
of the History of Medicine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 524.
2.
See Rene Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol 2, translated by John
Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff & Dugald Murdock (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
1984) at 50-62; Martha Chamallas, "Removing Emotional Harm from the Core of Tort Law" (2001) 54
Vand L Rev 751 at 758-761; Joanne Conaghan & Wade Mansell, The Wrongs of Tort, 2d ed (London:
Pluto Press, 1999) at 35-36.
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about women and emotion-based injuries, 3 and fear and incomprehension
of mental illnesses. 4
Although redress for some forms of mental harm' is possible through
torts, such as assault and defamation,6 courts have been more guarded
when the harm flows from negligent conduct. This is particularly true
for so-called independent or stand-alone mental harm, not ancillary to
physical injury.'
Actions for indemnification for negligently inflicted mental harm
started to appear more frequently by the middle of the 19th century with
the advent of passenger train travel.' As shown by the well-known case of

3.
Martha Chamallas & Linda K Kerber, "Women, Mothers and the Law of Fright: A History"
(1990) 88 Mich L Rev 814.
4.
See Michael L Perlin & Deborah A Dorfinan, "Sanism, Social Science, and the Development
of Mental Disability Law Jurisprudence" (1993) 11 Behav Sci L 47 at 47-48; Nancy Levit, "Ethereal
Torts" (1992) 61 Geo Wash L Rev 136 at 174-177.
5.
In this article, given the nature of the present inquiry, the expression "mental harm" has been
retained because it is wide enough to include emotional, psychological, or psychiatric injury. A similar
definition was adopted in Scottish Law Commission, Report on Damagesfor PsychiatricInjury (2004)
Scot L Com No 196, recommendation 3(a): "any harm to a person's mental state, mental function or
mental well-being, whether or not the harm amounted to a medically recognised medical disorder."
The choice of the term "mental harm" should not be construed as an endorsement of Cartesian dualism
advocating the separation of mind and body. See Robert E Kendell, "The Distinction between Mental
and Physical Illness" (2001) 178 BJ Psych 490 and the debate that followed his editorial. See also
Margo Louise Foster, "There was a High Court That Swatted a Fly.. .But Why? Mental Disability in
the Negligent Infliction of Psychiatric Injury and the Decision in Mustapha v. Culligan" (2009) 14
Appeal 37 at 42.
6.
For a good survey of the various causes of action addressing mental distress, see Paula Giliker,
"The 'New' Head of Damages: Damages for Mental Distress in the English Law of Torts" (2000)
20 LS 19; Peter Handford, Mullany & Handfords Tort Liability for Psychiatric Damage, 2d ed
(Sydney: Law Book Co, 2006) at 82-92 [Mullany & Handford];Harvey Teff, CausingPsychiatricand
Emotional Harm: Reshaping the Boundaries of Liablity (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009) at 28-29.
7.
Canadian case law and doctrine generally accept that mental harm flowing from a physical injury
is not subject to the same stringent limiting factors applied to independent or stand-alone mental harm
cases. See Zawadzki v Calimoso, 2011 BCSC 45 at para 106, 2011 BCJ 53; Hussack v Chilliwack
School DistrictNo 33, 2009 BCSC 852 at para 137, 97 BCLR (4th) 330, rev'd on other grounds 2011
BCCA 258, 19 BCLR (5th) 257; and Frazerv Haukioja,(2008) OJ No 3277 at 289, aff'd 2010 ONCA
249, 101 OR (3d) 528 [Frazer].
8.
See Danuta Mendelson, The Interfaces of Medicine and Lav: The History of the Liability for
Negligently Caused Psychiatric Injury (Nervous Shock) (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1998) at 36-56;
James Halpern & Mary Tramontin, Disaster Mental Health Theory and Practice (Belmont, CA:
Thomson Brooke/Cole, 2007) 46 at 49; Danuta Mendelson, "English medical experts and the claims
for shock occasioned by railway collisions in the 1860's: Issues of Law, Ethics and Medicine" (2002)
25:4 Int'l J L & Psychiatry 303.
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Victorian Railways Commissioners v Coultas,9 early claims were rejected
but doubts about this uncompromising approach soon arose. Hence,
throughout the 20th century, decisions have oscillated between generosity
towards plaintiffs"o and refusal to compensate."
In 2007, in Mustapha v Culligan of CanadaLtd,12 after a long hiatus,"
the Supreme Court of Canada commented on the principles applicable to
mental harm claims. An important part of the decision focussed on some
of the mechanisms to contain the ambit of compensation. 4 In this article,
the focus is on one of the control devices, namely the need for a plaintiff
to prove a "recognizable psychiatric illness" (RPI).
Since the early 1970s, Canadian courts generally agree that an RPI
is proven when a psychiatrist is able to confirm that the harm suffered

9.
(1888) 13 App Cas 222 (PC) [Coultas]. In that case, a gate-keeper erroneously signalled to
the driver of a buggy to enter the gate at a crossing while a train was approaching. A collision was
narrowly avoided but the plaintiff, who was sitting inside the buggy, was frightened to such an extent
that she suffered a form of mental shock due to extreme fright. She miscarried shortly afterwards. In
denying compensation, the Privy Council wrote, at 225: "[d]amages arising from mere sudden terror
unaccompanied by any actual physical injury, but occasioning a nervous or mental shock, cannot
under such circumstances... be considered a consequence which, in the ordinary course of things,
would flow from the negligence."
10. See, e.g., Dulieu v White & Sons, [1901] 2 KB 669; Hambrook v Stokes Bros, [1925] 1 KB 141;
McLouglin v O'Brian, [1982] 2 All ER 298 (HL) [McLoughlin]; and in Canada, Toronto Railway Co
v Toms (1911), 44 SCR 268 [Toronto Railway]; Horne v New Glasgow, [1954] 1 DLR 832 at 844
(NSSC) [Horne]; Mason v Westside Cemeteries Ltd (1996), 135 DLR (4th) 361, [1996] OJ No 1387
(SC) [Mason];Sant v Jack Andrews Kirkield Pharmacy,2001 MBQB 294, [2002] Man R (2d) 121.
I1. See, e.g., Bourhill v Young, [ 1943] AC 92 (HL); Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire
Police, [1992] 1 AC 310 (HL); and in Canada, Henderson v Canada Atlantic Railway (1898), 25
OAR 437 (CA) affd on other grounds (1899), 29 SCR 632; Miner v CPR (1911), 3 Alta LR 408 (CA)
[Miner]; Duwyn v Kaprielian(1978), 22 OR (2d) 736 (CA) [Duwyn]; Heighington v Ontario (1987),
60 OR (2d) 641 (HCJ) [Heighington, HCJ, aff'd on other grounds (1989), 69 OR (2d) 484 (CA);
Rhodes Estate v CNR (1990), 50 BCLR (2d) 273, (sub nom Rhodes v CanadianNational Railway Co)
75 DLR (4th) 248 (CA) [Rhodes]; Vanek v GreatAtlantic & Pacific Co of Canada(1999), 48 OR (3d)
228 (CA) [ Vanek]; Devji v Districtof Burnaby, 1999 BCCA 599, 180 DLR (4th) 205 [Devii]; Graham
v MacMillan, 2003 BCCA 90, 10 BCLR (4th) 397 [Graham].
12. 2008 SCC 27, [2008] 2 SCR 114 [Mustapha].
13. The Supreme Court of Canada dealt with compensation for mental harm in the negligence
context in three earlier cases: Vana v Tosta, [1968] SCR 7; Guay v Sun PublishingCo, [1953] 2 SCR
216; Toronto Railway, supra note 10. There was also a brief discussion on the nature of actionable
mental harm in Odhavji Estate v Woodhouse, 2003 SCC 69 at para 74, [2003] 3 SCR 263.
14. For instance, foreseeability of psychiatric injury in a person of reasonable fortitude. See
Mustapha, supranote 12 at paras 14-18. For a general discussion of the various limits, see Gerald
HL Fridman, The Law of Torts in Canada,3d ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2010) at 324 et seq; Lewis Klar,
Tort Law, 5th ed (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2012) 497 et seq; Allen M Linden & Bruce Feldthusen,
CanadianTort Law, 9th ed (Markham, Ont: LexisNexis, 2011) at ch 11; Philip H Osborne, The Law
of Torts, 4th ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2011) at 85-93.
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amounts to a mental disorder" described by reference to diagnostic criteria
found in classifications such as the American Psychiatric Association
DSM-IV-TR, 6 or the World Health Organization's ICD-10. 7
This strict interpretation of the RPI threshold has persisted even
if, as argued in a companion article," the Supreme Court's decision in
Mustapha can and should be seen as the basis for a more flexible approach.
Revisiting Mustapha in light of the evolution of the RIP requirement
throughout the 20th century was the first step in re-examining the nature
of actionable mental harm. The second step, considered in the present text,
is the evaluation of the policy considerations underlying the limitation of
compensable injury, and the proposal of a new threshold.' 9
The analysis starts with a brief overview in Part I of the Supreme
Court's decision in Mustapha and its aftermath. Then, in Part II, policy
considerations for and against limiting the extent of actionable mental
harm are canvased and assessed. Informed by this discussion, Part III
of this article examines and discards both the option of eliminating all
thresholds and the option of keeping the current RPI formula. This leads to
15. See, e.g., Devji, supra note 11 at para 83, where the Court wrote: "The medical distinction
between psychiatric injury and ordinary grief or distress turns on diagnosis of a psychiatric illness,"
and explained that a number of psychiatric illnesses may follow trauma including posttraumatic stress
disorder (PTSD); Graham, supra note 11 at para 4, where despite the family physician's testimony
at trial, the Court noted that "there was no psychiatric evidence" and the plaintiff could not be
compensated; Schulze (Litigation Guardian of) v Strain, 2010 BCSC 1516, [2010] BCJ No 2090
[Schulze] where the only medical witness at trial was deemed unqualified to make a diagnosis of
recognized psychiatric illness; Healey v Lakeridge Health Corporation,2010 ONSC 725 at para 120,
[2010] OJ No 417 [Healey SCJ, affd in part 2011 ONCA 55, 103 OR (3rd) 401 [Healey CA], where
the trial judge wrote: "Defining 'psychiatric illness' as any mental disorder as described by the [DSM
IV], which is the authoritative diagnostic manual used by physicians and others to defined [sic] what
is a recognizable psychiatric illness." Contra Ulmer v Weidmann, 2011 BCSC 130 at para 224, [2011]
BCJ No 158 [Ulmer]; FakhrivAlfalfa 's CanadaInc, 2004 BCCA 549, 34 BCLR (4th) 201 at para 16.
16. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders:
DSM-IV-TR, 4th ed (Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, 2000), online: <http://www.
psych.org/> [DSM-IV-TRI. The DSM-5 will be published in 2013.
17. World Health Organization, The ICD-10 Classificationof Mental and Behavioural Disorders,
2010, online: <http://www.who.int/classifications/icd/enIbluebook.pdf> ch 5 [ICD-10].
18. Louise B6langer-Hardy, "Reconsidering the "Recognizable Psychiatric Illness" Requirement
in Canadian Negligence Law" (2013) 38 Queen's LJ 583, available on SSRN [B61anger-Hardy,
"Reconsidering"].
19. There is a dearth of academic and judicial commentary on the RPI threshold. See Des
Butler, "Identifying the Compensable Damage in 'Nervous Shock' Cases" (1997) 5 Torts LJ 67 at
67 (LexisNexis) [Butler, "Compensable Damage"]; Des Butler, Damages for Psychiatric Injury
(Annandale, NSW: Federation Press, 2004) at 87-89, 132-144 [Butler, Damages]; Spencer Campbell
& Chris Montigny, "Psychological Harm and Tort Law: Reassessing the Legal Test for Liability"
in Todd Archibald & Michael Cochrane, eds, Annual Review of Civil Litigation (Toronto: Thomson
Carswell, 2003) 133 at 144 et seq; Mullany & Handford, supra note 6 especially ch 2, 4; Rachael
Mulheron, "Rewriting the Requirement for a 'Recognized Psychiatric Injury' in Negligence Claims"
(2012) 32:1 OJLS 77, whose recent study focuses on English law from a comparative perspective;
Teff, supra note 6.
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the analysis of other limiting tests including a threshold based on harm that
is "serious and prolonged," a formula considered in a few post-Mustapha
decisions. Finally, in Part IV, a model based on compensation of all forms
of mental harm except "mere upsets" is proposed as the formula most apt
to respond to the policy concerns previously outlined. In the conclusion
Canadian courts are invited to adopt a flexible approach toward actionable
mental harm based on a pragmatic assessment of the relevant facts and the
evidence provided by a variety of health professionals.
I. Mustapha and the nature of actionablemental harm
In Mustapha,the threshold of actionable mental harm was not at issue. By
all accounts, the plaintiff, Mr. Mustapha, suffered a severe mental illness
after seeing a dead fly and the remnants of another in the large sealed water
container delivered to his home by the defendant, Culligan of Canada Ltd.
Nevertheless, in obiter, the Supreme Court commented on the matter. After
stating that "[t]he distinction between physical and mental injury is elusive
and arguably artificial in the context of tort," the Court noted the need to
distinguish between a "psychological disturbance that rises to the level of
personal injury" and "psychological upset."20 The Court then wrote:
Personal injury at law connotes serious trauma or illness... The law does
not recognize upset, disgust, anxiety, agitation or other mental states that
fall short of injury. I would not purport to define compensable injury
exhaustively, except to say that it must be serious and prolonged and rise
above the ordinary annoyances, anxieties and fears that people living in
society routinely, if sometimes reluctantly, accept ... Quite simply, minor
and transient upsets do not constitute personal injury, and hence do not
amount to damage." 21
The Court noted the trial judge's finding that Mr. Mustapha had "developed
a major depressive disorder with associated phobia and anxiety." 22 In
such circumstances, "the psychiatric illness was debilitating and had a
significant impact on his life; it qualifies as a personal injury at law." 23
Significantly, the Court did not use the term "recognizable psychiatric
illness."
Since Mustapha, Canadian courts have had to grapple with the
contention that the Supreme Court's decision changed the law on the

20. Mustapha, supra note 12 at paras 8-9.
21. Ibid at para 9 [emphasis in original, legal citations omitted].
22. Ibid at para 10.
23. Ibid.Nevertheless, the mental harm was considered too remote and, on that basis, Mr Mustapha's
appeal was dismissed since his psychiatric injury was not foreseeable in a "person of ordinary
fortitude," ibid at para 14.
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nature of actionable mental harm: the threshold of recovery is not an RPI
but something less, a "serious and prolonged injury." Lower courts have
not been receptive to this suggestion. In two key decisions, Healey,24 and
Kotai v The Queen of the North,2 doubts were raised about the Supreme
Court's intention to bring about significant change,' a point of view
endorsed by other post-Mustaphadecisions. 27
Mustapha should not be interpreted in such a restrictive way.28 At
a minimum, the Court's words raise enough doubt about the traditional
approach to warrant an in-depth policy discussion of the threshold of
actionable mental harm in the context of the tort of negligence.
II. Policy considerationsand the RPI threshold
Although policy considerations underlying the need to treat mental harm
claims restrictively have often been discussed in the literature, teasing out
concerns about the nature of actionable mental harm has not often been
done. This is particularly challenging because Canadian courts have rarely
deliberately explained why they endorse the need for the RPI threshold.
Nevertheless, some judicial and scholarly explanations, both in Canada
and elsewhere, give an indication of the preoccupations at play. These
can be grouped around four general themes: the attitude and behaviour
of plaintiffs, pragmatic considerations and evidentiary rules including
the reliance on classifications such as DSM-IV-TR and ICD-10, the fear
of proliferation of claims, and the wider social context including critical
analysis of tort law's devaluation of mental harm.
1. Behavioural and attitudinalissues
The first set of policy considerations focuses specifically on plaintiffs. At
issue is the notion that without the RPI limit, damages for minor transient
mental conditions will be easily obtainable and, consequently, claimants
will resist rehabilitation.2 9 The prospect that compensation could render
24. Healey CA, supranote 15. The case involved two class actions by a large number of patients who
received notices of potential exposure to tuberculosis.
25. 2009 BCSC 1405, [2009] BCJ No 2022, supplementary reasons in Kotai v The Queen of the
North, 2009 BCSC 1604, [2009] BCJ No 2332 [Kotai SR]. In that case, passengers, including a
number of young children, sued for negligence after the ferry on which they were travelling sank en
route to Vancouver Island.
26. Kotai SR, ibid at para 65; Healey CA, supra note 15 at para 61.
27. See, e.g., Schulze, supra note 15; Thompson v Saanich (District) Police Department, 2010
BCCA 308, 320 DLR (4th) 496, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 2010 SCC No 329; other cases
discussed in Bdlanger-Hardy, "Reconsidering," supra note 18.
28. See "Reconsidering," ibid.
29. Tame vNew South Wales (2002), 211 CLR 317 at para 192, 191 ALR 449 (HC) cited in Mulheron,
supra note 19 at 82; White (Frost)v ChiefConstable ofSouth Yorkshire Police,[1999] 2 AC 455 at 494
(HL), per Lord Steyn [White].
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mental harm incurable has even been raised." A related issue is the
suggestion that plaintiffs are more likely to make fraudulent claims or to
malinger given the less observable and less public character of mental
harm. In Healey, the Ontario Court ofAppeal noted the "highly subjective
nature of an individual's reaction to stresses and strains." 3 2
Arguments centered on plaintiff behaviour have persisted through
the years.33 They are problematic on many levels especially when they
are offered as generalizations without appropriate scientific or social
underpinnings. For instance, whether rehabilitation is hampered by
litigation is a complex question, intensely debated in the literature.34 Some
researchers have suggested that litigation may in fact have a therapeutic
effect and help in the recovery process." As for the issue of malingering,
the fear of bogus claims apparently increased after the publication of an
English study in the 1960s36 and some courts continue to be swayed by
this concern.3 Tools have, however, been developed by the psychological
and medical professions to identify problems and mitigate their effect
thereby increasing courts' ability to deal with simulation in mental harm
30. See Teff, supranote 6 at 145, who notes this concern and refers to the Court of Appeal decision
in McLoughlin v O'Brian, [1981] QB 599 at 616, Stephenson LJ (this decision was reversed, see
McLoughlin, supra note 10). See also White, ibid; Butler, Damages, supra note 19 at 32-33, who
discusses links between various health conditions and the litigation process.
31. See Devji, supra note II at para 47. This issue is discussed in Linden & Feldthusen, supra note
14 at 426; Osborne, supra note 14 at 85; Mullany & Handford,supra note 6 at ch 4; Teff, supra note 6;
John E Stannard, "Sticks, Stones and Words; Emotional Harm and the English Criminal Law" (2010)
74 JCL 533, who compares English criminal law and tort law.
32. Healey CA, supranote 15 at 65.
33. Indeed, this concern was first noted in Coultas, supranote 9 at 226: the Privy Council mentioned
the danger of "imaginary claims."
34. Paul B Suter, "Employment and Litigation: Improved by Work, Assisted by Verdict" (2002) 100
Pain 249; Natalie M Spearing & Luke B Connelly, "Is compensation 'bad for health'? A systematic
meta-review" (2011) 42:1 Injury 15; Nieke A Elbersa et al, "Do compensation processes impair mental
health? A meta-analysis" (2012) 44:5 Injury 674, online: <http://www.sciencedirect.com/sciencel
article/piiISO020138311005717>.
35. See Peter A Bell, "The Bell Tolls: Towards Full Tort Recovery for Psychic Injury" (1984) 36 U
Fla L Rev 333 at 375-376; Daniel W Shuman, "Making the World a Better Place through Tort Law?:
Through the Therapeutic Looking Glass" (1992-1993) 10 NYL Sch J Hum Rts 739 at 755-758.
36. Henry Miller, "Mental after-effects of head injury" (1966) 59:3 Proc R Soc Med 257 cited in
Teff, supranote 6 at 146. In his paper, Miller discusses the mental sequelae of head injuries including
the condition called "accident neurosis" which he defines, at 258, as a "complaint of disabling
subjective functional nervous symptoms following accidental injury or sometimes fright without
physical injury of any kind." Miller draws conclusions from his earlier 1961 study of some 51 such
cases. He concludes, at 258, that "[n]early all these patients recover completely and without treatment
after the case is settled" and, in fairly harsh words, speaks of "lifelong martyrdom" and states that the
cases are closer to malingering than to any form of mental illness. His words were influential at the
time as it appears only one other researcher had previously delved into the issue: Miller at 258-259.
37. See, Devii, supra note II at para 47 where the Court states that it is "not confident that the
administration of justice is usually able to identify unmeritorious claims successfully" and points to
the need for "judicial scepticism."
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cases.3 As noted by Linden and Feldthusen, "the remedy for fraud is to be
found in a vigorous search for the truth, not in the abdication of judicial
responsibility.""3
Amore troubling question arises, however. What message does the law
send in endorsing the suggestion that persons with mental harm are likely
to fabricate their injuries? Writing from a disability studies perspective,4 0
Foster points out that this assumption "incorporates a moral condemnation
of the disabled plaintiff... [either as someone who cheats the system or is
of] low moral fibre."41 This culture of blaming the victim harks back to
out-dated conceptions of mental illness which have no part in today's legal
system.
Generally speaking, the concerns grouped under this first theme can
be seen as the product of another era and none of them justifies clinging
to the RPI formula. In addition, issues of rehabilitation, malingering, and
compensation neurosis are not unique to mental harm and many physical
injuries are just as likely to create evidentiary challenges for a court.42
2. Pragmaticconcerns, scope of liability, and reliance on diagnostic
classifications
The second set ofpolicy considerations centers on the predictability brought
to the law by a threshold such as the RPI formula. This viewpoint has found
favour in both Kotai and Healey. In the first case the court explained how
the RPI rule "introduces a degree of objectivity and certainty to the law
through the mechanism of expert medical evidence,"4 3 while in the second
case the court suggested that insisting on an RPI brought "evidentiary
38. See Andreas Kapardis, Psychology and Law-A Critical Introduction, 3d ed (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2010) at ch 8, where the author outlines a numbers of paradigms to study
deception; Laura LS Howe, "Distinguishing Genuine from Malingered Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
in Head Injury Litigation" in Cecil R Reynolds & Arthur MacNeill Jr, eds, Detection ofMalingering
During HeadInjury Litigation, 2d ed (New York: Springer, 2012) at 301; Bell, supra note 35 at 351.
Interestingly, a court's ability to deal with the challenge of fabrication was recognised by the Supreme
Court of Canada as early as 1911 in Toronto Railway, supra note 10 at 276.
39. Linden & Feldthusen, supra note 14 at 427. See also Teff, supra note 6 at 146-147 and the
scientific literature cited at notes 43-47. At 151, Teff notes how difficult it would be for plaintiffs
to fake mental harm "dupe medical experts, walk straight into the courtroom and persuade judge
and counsel that a relatively minor upset has caused them serious psychiatric illness which merits
substantial redress." Butler, Damages, supra note 19 at 132: "Instead, like physical injuries, there
should be faith in the capacity of the adversarial system and the scrutiny to which both expert and lay
evidence are subjected to confirm the legitimacy of claims."
40. See Ontarianswith DisabilitiesAct, 2001, SO 2001, c 32, s 2 where "disability" is defined as
"(b) a condition of mental impairment or a developmental disability, (c) a learning disability, or a
dysfunction in one or more of the processes involved in understanding or using symbols or spoken
language, (d) a mental disorder." The critical disability theory viewpoint is discussed further below.
41. Foster, supra note 5 at 56.
42. Butler, Damages, supranote 19 at 72.
43. Kotai SR, supra note 25 at para 68.
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rigour" to help counter the "frequency with which everyday experiences
cause transient distress" or "the multifactorial causes of psychological
upset.""
The RPI test is therefore viewed as a neat formula which satisfies the
need for bright lines in this area of law.45 Without this limit, difficulties
about the quantification of damages would increase46 and there would be
greater diagnostic uncertainty,47 increased costs for experts and lengthier
litigation as debates on changing medical theories would be more likely
to occur.48
Preoccupations of this nature are not universal. Critics mention the
fact that very similar difficulties arise in the context of physical harm 49
with less judicial concern.so Keeping in mind advances in the medical
field, the argument whereby a more flexible threshold of actionable harm
would lead to more complex and unmanageable litigation is opposed in a
number of ways. As noted by Thomas J. in van Soest v Residual Health
Management Unit: "doctors can speak with a great deal of precision
without needing to address the question whether the mental suffering
is a recognizable psychiatric illness or not."" Ward suggests that while
mental harm cases may "involve complex and difficult issues of causation,
they do not have any special quality which could justify imposing more
restrictive rules as to liability than apply to ordinary personal injuries."52
Partlett quite bluntly states that "litigation costs [are] exacerbated by the
'psychiatric illness' test," mostly because its "inherent uncertainty will
encourage initiation of claims for it is likely that the value of the claim

44. Healey CA, supranote 15 at 65. See also Osborne, supra note 14 at 85.
45. See Martin H Matthews, "Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: A View of the Proposed
Restatement (Third) Provisions from England" (2009) 44 Wake Forest L Rev 1177 at 1182; Stannard,
supra note 31 at 540, who mentions, and then criticises, the suggestion that RPI is a clear criterion.
46. Brooks v CanadianPacificRailway, 2007 SKQB 247, 283 DLR (4th) 540 at para 58 [Brooks].
This point is discussed by Giliker, supra note 6 at 22 and by Butler, Damages,supra note 19 at 73-74.
47. White, supranote 29 at 493, a source highlighted and discussed by Teff, supranote 6 at 142-145,
nn 43-47.
48. Mulheron, supranote 19 at 82 citing Tame, supranote 29 at 192 and White, supranote 29 at 503.
49. McDermott vRamadanovicEstate,(1988), 27 BCLR (2d) 45 at 53 (SC), per Southin J; Stannard,
supranote 31 at 553.
50. Teff, supra note 6 at 142. See, e.g., Horne, supranote 10 at 844: the Court points out that "[t]he
ease with which in the one case the damages are capable of being ascertained, and the difficulty which
in the other case may frequently arise, cannot be made the test of liability."
51. [2000] 1 NZLR 179 at para 103 (CA). Mullany & Handford,supra note 6 at 79, adds: "more is
now known about the effects of emotions on the body and doctors can with a considerable degree of
precision identify various forms of emotional distress and their effects."
52. Tony Ward, "Psychiatric Evidence and Judicial Fact-finding" (1999) 3 Int'l J Evidence & Proof
180 at 193. He acknowledges, at 181, that a minority of situations raise difficult scientific questions
but he maintains that the problems encountered are not unique to psychiatric evidence.
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may be inflated by the claimant."" A different point is made by Bottalico
and Bruni who explain that
[n]euroscience attempts to narrow the gap between physical and mental
harm. If it succeeds, there will probably no longer be justification for
their separate treatment.... Further research in neuroscience and the use
of more advanced neuroimaging technologies will allow us to explain
emotional suffering through [the] brain's structure and function in a
more sophisticated way.54
If this is the case, there might be little sense in drawing the line at an RPI.
The notion that the RPI requirement leads to greater certainty in the
law must be considered in light of the courts' reliance on the psychiatric
profession and classifications such as the DSM-IV 5 and the ICD-10.6 A
common criticism is that these compendiums were designed for medical
research and diagnoses and their use in the legal setting raises a number

53. David F Partlett, "Tort Liability and the American Way: Reflections on Liability for Emotional
Distess" (1997) 45 Am J of Comp L 171 at 182 [Partlett]. This article reviews the first edition of
Mullany & Handford,supra note 6, and in his review Partlett criticizes the RPI threshold and argues
that it should not be introduced into American law.
54. Barbara Bottalico & Tommaso Bruni, "Post traumatic stress disorder, neuroscience, and the law"
(2012) 35:2 Int'l J L & Psychiatry 112 at 118-119. The authors acknowledge the matter is complex
and that serious problems remain: for example the exclusion of pre-existent conditions at 118. In Peter
Tyrer & Nick Craddock, "The Bicentennial Volume of the British JournalofPsychiatry:The Winding
Pathway of Mental Science" (2012) 200:1 British J of Psych I at 3, the two editors discuss future
trends in psychiatry and note that recent studies "are starting to point to the role of specific biological
pathways and mechanisms in illness and helping to reveal the relationships between the major
psychiatric disorders that have hitherto been classified on purely descriptive grounds. This represents
the next stage in mental science's long journey of discovery." See also, Betsy J Grey, "Neuroscience
and Emotional Harm in Tort Law: Rethinking the American Approach to Free-Standing Emotional
Distress Claims" in Michael Freeman, ed, Law and Neuroscience-Current Legal Issues, vol 13
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 203 at 212, who points to research suggesting that there
might be an increased ability to detect and quantify emotional harm through neuroscience. It must be
said, however, that this author's main thesis is that the RPI formula should be adopted by American
courts because, at 226, it would "shift a normative decision to a medically based one." She argues that
moving to a medical model would align the law with advances in neuroscience and thus de-emphasize
the distinction between physical and mental harm. Although this objective is desirable, this author
does not see the endorsement of the RPI rule as the solution to the current mind/body distinction. See
also Adam J Kolber, "The Experiential Future of the Law" (2011) 60 Emory LJ 585 at 618-622, who
argues that new technologies will make it easier to assess various forms of mental harm.
55. Supra note 16. The DSM is a classificatory system of psychiatric disorders and their
corresponding diagnostic codes by the American Psychiatric Association. Each disorder lists a set of
diagnostic criteria to which some explanations are attached. The classification system does not provide
any information about treatment. The DSM reflects only current knowledge and the emphasis is on
patterns of symptoms.
56. Supra note 17. The ICD-10 is a classification of all diseases by the World Health Organization,
not just mental disorders. A numeric code and a short description including symptoms are provided for
each condition.
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of serious issues." For instance, Mulheron explains that many of the
classifications' built-in caveats and qualifications are not discussed in
judgments." She also highlights the tension between the weight to be given
to concordance with diagnostic criteria listed in the classifications on the
one hand, and clinical judgment (provided without insistence on these
tools) on the other." From a Canadian perspective, this is an interesting
point because while most courts insist on proof of a psychiatric illness
identified in the DSM-IV-TR or the lCD- 10,o a few are more flexible and,
in one case, clearly critical of this approach. 6 1
This last point is closely related to concerns about judicial deference
to psychiatric experts. Mulheron refers to the DSM-IV-TR's introduction
and its warning that the classification should "not be applied mechanically
by untrained individuals." 62 She submits that, if the RPI criterion must
be endorsed, the "starting point" should be the expert witness's opinion
on actionable mental harm. However, when opinions differ, the court
should resolve the matter.63 Jones suggests that courts should not defer
to the psychiatric profession too readily and should be cognizant of the
possibility of controversies about psychiatric diagnoses.' For his part,
Slovenko acknowledges that psychiatric diagnosis has a role to play
in the legal process but warns that "it is not always a sine qua non in

57. Stannard, supra note 31 at 542; Mulheron, supra note 19 at 87.
58. Ibid; an example of a caveat is the need to review all DSM-lV-TR axes (I to V) in making
a psychiatric diagnosis, not just Axis I. This is not always understood by legal actors. For a more
complete explanation of some of the drawbacks of the classification systems, Mulheron refers to the
work of David Gill, "Proving and Disproving Psychiatric Injury" (2008) 76 Medico-Legal J 143 and
"Psychiatric Injury: Checks and Balances" (2009) 75 Personal Injury LJ 16.
59. Mulheron, supra note 19 at 89-91.
60. See, e.g., Healey SC, supranote 15 at para 120 where the trial judge wrote: "Defining 'psychiatric
illness' as any mental disorder as described by the [DSM-IV-TR], which is the authoritative diagnostic
manual used by physicians and others to define what is a recognizable psychiatric illness." See also
Bruneau v Bruneau (1997), 32 BCLR (3d) 317, [1997] BCJ No 30, where, in assessing whether a
mother who had come upon the scene of a car accident involving her 20 month-old infant had suffered
PTSD, the trial judge systematically assessed the DSM criteria for this condition before concluding
that there was an RPI.
61. In the post-Mustaphacase of Ulmer,supranote 15 at para 224, the Court "did not find a reference
to the DSM-IV criteria on this issue of PTSD to be helpful to me at all." The Court reiterated the need
for an RPI, but concluded that "diagnosis is a matter of clinical judgment" and reliance could be placed
on the clinical opinion of one psychologist and two psychiatrists.
62. DSM-IV-TR, supranote 16 at xxxii.
63. Mulheron, supranote 19 at 93.
64. Michael A Jones, "Liability for Psychiatric Damage: Searching for a Path between Pragmatism
and Principle" in Jason W Neyers, Erika Chamberlain & Stephen GA Pitel, eds, Emerging Issues in
Tort Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007) 113 at 137.
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the resolution of a legal matter. It may result in a "battle of categories,"
diverting attention from the issue at hand.""
Considering the objective of certainty from a broader perspective,
another concern created by the dependence on classification systems is
that diagnostic criteria are not static, and hence, not necessarily reflected
in the latest version of the compendiums. Thus, a claim based on a
"newer" condition could be rejected by a Court opting for strict adherence
to the diagnostic criteria.66 After noting that the field of medicine is in a
"constant state of flux," Campbell and Montigny ask if a claimant should
"be required to await the development of a significant body of publications
concerning her illness prior to commencing action?"
Another important point is the recognition that including a mental
condition in the classifications can be an exercise fraught with controversy.
This is well illustrated by the current debate leading to the release of the
next edition of the DSM, anticipated for the spring of 2013. Of particular
relevance to the issue of actionable mental harm is the disagreement about
the inclusion of grief as a pathological disorder. As explained by Bryant,
the issue has raised "enormous controversy" with opponents arguing
that including "adjustment disorder related to bereavement" as a new
diagnosis is a form of medicalization of grief, and proponents suggesting
that some bereaved people experiencing marked impairment are entitled
to recognition of their condition and to targeted treatment.68 Although one
may not go as far as stating that the classifications' diagnostic criteria
are "composed of sandstone rather than granite,"" the debate about the
recognition of grief as a psychiatric disorder illustrates the challenges
within the psychiatric profession. As noted by Young, even the imminent
revision of the DSM will leave many key issues unresolved and much
research remains to be done.7 0
Therefore, when considering this set of policy justifications as a
whole, two important points must be made. First, many of the concerns
such as quantification of damages and weight of expert evidence, are not

65. Ralph Solvenko, "Commentary-The Role of Psychiatric Diagnosis in the Law" (2002) 30 J of
Psy & L 421 at 438.
66. Mulheron, supranote 19 at 94-95; Jones, supranote 64 at 133, stating that courts are not "dealing
with fixed phenomena."
67. Supra note 19 at 145.
68. Richard A Bryant, "Grief as a Psychiatric Disorder" (2012) 201 British Journal of Psychiatry 9 at
9-10. See also Mario Maj, "Depression, Bereavement, and "Understandable" Intense Sadness: Should
the DSM-IV Approach be Revised?" (2008) 165:11 Am J Psychiatry 1373.
69. Partlett, supra note 53 at 180, speaking specifically about PTSD.
70. Gerald Young, "Trends in Psychological/Psychiatric Injury and Law: Continuing Education,
Practice Comments, Recommendations" (2010) Psychol Inj & Law 323 at 346.
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unique to mental harm. These apply to physical harm as well" and are
part of a wider debate about the efficiency of the civil liability system. As
such, they fail to strongly support the status quo regarding the threshold
of compensable mental harm. Secondly, insisting on the need to prove
an RPI does not ensure certainty within the law. As discussed above, the
search for concordance with diagnostic criteria is not an easy task and with
the advancement of scientific knowledge debates within the psychiatric
profession will continue to occur. Accordingly, the RPI formula is not a
warranty against uncertainty. Whether abolishing or lowering the existing
threshold of actionable mental harm would eliminate the problem of
uncertainty is another question altogether. The matter is addressed in more
detail below.
3. Fearofprolhferation of claims and the burdenforjudicial
administration
Another set of policy justifications can be grouped under the oftenmentioned floodgates argument. The fear of a proliferation of actions
permeates the whole law of negligently caused mental harm. Generally,
the perception is that a single negligent event can lead to a large number
of claims because mental harm in some form or another is more likely
to occur than physical injury.7 2 Klar sees the RPI requirement as a
"practical way to limit recoverability," 3 while Osborne notes that "judicial
apprehension about large numbers of claims is intensified by the prospect
of mass disasters such as aircraft crashes, train disasters.. .all of which may
generate, in addition to personal injury and death, extensive psychiatric
injury."74 In this context, the argument becomes the following: lowering
the threshold or removing it altogether would increase the number of civil
actions because more individuals could claim to have been psychologically
or emotionally affected by a negligent act than if recovery was restricted
only to those who could prove a psychiatric illness under one of the
classifications. Another strand of the floodgates argument points to the
danger of a disproportionate burden on defendants and their insurers" and

71. See Mullany & Handford, supra note 6 at 79, who state that "difficulty of valuation and
assessment is a poor rationale for denial when one considers that awards for the non-pecuniary
components of personal injury damages, such as pain and suffering, are routinely made but, by their
very nature, are also incapable of valuation."
72. See Devji, supranote 11 at para 47; Brooks, supranote 46 at para 58.
73. Klar, supra note 14 at 499.
74. Osborne, supranote 14 at 85. See also Mulheron, supra note 19 at 82 citing Tame, supranote 29
at 192.
75. Discussed by Bell, supranote 35 at 363-366; Osborne, supranote 14 at 85; Teff, supranote 6 at
142; Heighington,HCJ, supranote 11 at 657.
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the corresponding pressure on the administration ofjustice. 6 In Kotai, the
Court described the RPI rule as "one of the control mechanisms that have
been employed to maintain what is perceived to be a fair balance between
the plaintiffs and defendants.""
Although the fear of floodgates is easy to raise, both in the judicial
context and, as noted by Teff, by the news media and the general public, 8
it must be considered very carefully. First, many of the arguments
expressed through the "floodgates" label are not unique to mental harm
cases. Mass disasters can bring about large scale physical harm while
other negligent acts may raise complex legal issues about physical injuries.
These situations are just as likely to raise questions about disproportionate
liability or excessive administrative costs. 79 Second, litigation is costly,
time-consuming and takes an enormous toll on a person's life, thus
deterring many from pursuing legal action including someone with mental
harm amounting to less than an RPI. Third, the legal system itself has a
number of built-in barriers to negligence-based claims; these range from
practical measures such as limitation periods and rules as to costs, to
liability principles such as causation and remoteness."o As evidenced by
the final result in Mustapha,principles such as remoteness may turn out to
be significant hurdles for plaintiffs.8 '
Regarding the specific question of lowering or eliminating the RPI
threshold, one must admit that such a measure would certainly increase
the number of potential claimants in the sense that more individuals would
consider themselves eligible for compensation. Concluding that this would
result in a corresponding increase in the number of civil actions is another
76. This point is discussed by Butler, Damages, supranote 19 at 76.
77. Kotai SR, supranote 25 at para 58.
78. Teff, supra note 6 at 150-151: the author makes various interesting comments about the role
of the popular press and other news media in promoting the fear of floodgates climate. He argues, at
151, that media stories about exaggerated or unusual claims create resentment and "builds on populist
scepticism about non-physical symptoms." The facts in Mustapha led to unusual media interest for a
tort case, none too sympathetic to the plaintiff: see Kirk Makin, "Supreme Court Overturns Damages
for Fly in Bottled Water," The Globe and Mail (23 May 2008) A5; Janice Tibbetts, "Court Swats Flyin-Water Lawsuit," NationalPost (23 May 2008) A7. See comments by Foster, supranote 5 at 37-38.
79. Butler, Damages,supra note 19 at 76. See, for example, Andersen v St Jude Medical Inc, 2012
ONSC 3660, a recent complex medical device products liability case, certified in 2003, which has
engaged huge resources, as explained by Lax J at the beginning of her judgment at para 8: "2,293
documents were introduced into evidence as exhibits in electronic format with many exhibits running
to hundreds of pages. The court heard testimony for 138 days from 40 witnesses, including 23 expert
witnesses from 14 different disciplines in science and medicine. At the conclusion of the evidence, the
parties delivered voluminous written submissions over a period of several months and 18 months after
the trial had commenced, it concluded in late September 2011 with eight days of closing submissions."
80. See Mulheron, supra note 19 at 110-111 who discusses the application of these measures in
English law.
81. SeePart labove.
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matter altogether. At least two sets of data would have to be relied on to
confirm a possible increase in claims: the prevalence of mental harm (not
just psychiatric illness) in the general population following negligently
caused events, and the extent to which victims would seek redress before
the courts. Neither of these data sets currently exists.
Taking the second question first, at the moment, no Canadian data exists
on the incidence of civil claims for mental harm.82 Conclusions, therefore,
about possible increases or decreases in litigation cannot confidently be
made. As for the prevalence of mental harm caused by traumatic events
in the general population, literature on the topic has focused mostly on
psychiatric responses to trauma, especially PTSD" leaving the question
of negligently inflicted mental harm amounting to less than an RPI largely
unexplored. For instance, a 2008 Canadian epidemiological survey
on trauma exposure and PTSD,84 related that 76.1% of the participants
reported lifetime exposure to one or more traumatic events and that the
rate of current PTSD (at the time of the interview) was 2.4% while the
lifetime rate was 9.2%. Of course, these figures have to be understood
in their proper context. For instance, the list of 18 qualifying traumatic
events did not focus on negligent acts at all although some eventsexposure to toxic chemicals, life-threatening motor vehicle accidents, very
serious work-related accidents, a traumatic experience by a loved-one, and
seeing someone badly injured or killed-could originate from a tortious
act. Consequently, the figures generated by this Canadian study cannot
easily be transferred to the tort context. Hence, research on the prevalence
of certain psychiatric disorders generates interesting information but fails
to provide statistics on the incidence of mental harm in the population

82. Statistics Canada gathers some information on "initiated and active civil court cases" from 7 out
of 13 provinces/territories but this data comprises only family, probate, small claims, and other general
civil actions. It does not provide disaggregate data for negligence actions let alone those based on
mental harm. See Statistics Canada, "Table 1-Initiated and Active Civil Court Cases," online: <http://
www.statcan.gc.caldaily-quotidien/090120/t090120dl-eng.htm>. This is the governmental agency's
latest analytical report on the matter. See Teff, supra note 6 at 155-165 and the references therein,
especially Richard Lewis, Annette Morris & Ken Oliphant, "Tort Personal Injury Claims Statistics:
Is There a Compensation Culture in the United Kingdom?" (2006) 14(2) Torts LJ 158 (LexisNexis),
online: SSRN <http://papers.ssm.com/2013/papers.cfn?abstract-id=892981>.
83. Given that, by definition, PTSD requires a link to an identifiable stressing event and that the
symptoms are connected to that stressor, measuring the likelihood of PTSD is easier than for other
psychiatric disorders such as depression: see Naomi Breslau, "Epidemiologic Studies of Trauma,
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, and Other Psychiatric Disorders" (2002) 47:10 Can J Psychiatry 923 at
927.
84. Michael Van Ameringen et al, "Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in Canada" (2008) 14 CNS
Neuroscience & Therapeutics 171. The sample size was 2,991 and participants came from Ontario,
Quebec, Atlantic, and Western Canada with a 60:40 female/male ratio.
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following a negligent act, let alone the rate of increase one could anticipate
if the RPI criterion was lessened or abandoned."
In the end, the lack of data on the incidence of negligence actions for
compensation for stand-alone mental harm means that floodgates concerns
remain impressionistic and unsupported by empirical evidence; they can
neither be completely eliminated nor fully justified and, in that context,
courts should avoid generalizations that cannot be substantiated.
4. Wider social issues
The last set of policy concerns focus on wider social choices and issues.
Chief amongst the arguments justifying the RPI threshold is the notion that
all members of society need to develop a certain emotional robustness.
Upsets, distress and other transient emotions should not give rise to the
recovery of damages because they are "normal." This is the only policy
6
reason mentioned briefly by the Supreme Court of Canada in Mustapha.1
According to the Court of Appeal in Healey, it is "appropriate for the law
to decline monetary compensation for the distress and upset caused by the
unfortunate but inevitable stresses of life in civilized society.""
Why should the law "foster the growth of tough hides not easily pierced
by emotional responses" to borrow Linden and Feldthusen's words? "Apart
from references to difficulties of valuation of harm and proliferation of
claims, both discussed above, some courts have emphasized the transient
nature of the harm or its commonality.89 The notion that the law is neither
the only nor the best mechanism to deal with minor mental afflictions is also
mentioned." Keating points out that mental distress caused by witnessing
ordinary accidents may simply be "an inevitable by-product of the reality
that essential modem activities harness the enormous destructive power of
advanced technologies" and that since these activities are deemed essential

85. Other studies on the prevalence of some psychiatric disorders after traumatic events include
Breslau, supra note 83; Sandro Galea, Arijit Nandi & David Viahov, "The Epidemiology of PostTraumatic Stress Disorder after Disasters" (2005) 27 Epidemiol Rev 78; Halpern & Tramontin, supra
note 8 at 111-136; Naomi Breslau, "The Epidemiology of Trauma, PTSD, and other Posttrauma
Disorders" (2009) 10 Trauma, Violence & Abuse 198.
86. Supra note 12 at para 9, the Court wrote: "The need to accept such upsets rather than seek redress
in tort is what I take the Court ofAppeal [in Mustapha]to be expressing in its quote from Vanek [supra
note 11 at para 60]: 'Life goes on'."
87. Healey, CA, supra note 15 at 418.
88. Supra note 14 at 427.
89. McLouglin, supra note 10 at 431, per Lord Bridge; White, supranote 29 at 465, cited by Mullany
& Handford, supra note 6 at 80-81. The authors query, at 80, "why the fact that it is commonly
experienced is of itself a reason for denying recovery. This logic has not affected recoverability for the
universal experienced sensation of physical (as opposed to emotional) pain."
90. Des Butler, "An Assessment of Competing Policy Considerations in Cases of Psychiatric Injury
Resulting from Negligence" (2002) 10(1) Torts LJ 13 (LexisNexis) at 3.1.1.
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to modem living, members of society "must generally bear the distress
they cause when they go awry." 1 A different but related concern is that by
expanding liability through a threshold lower than an RPI, the law would
simply place too many limits on human endeavours: 92 individuals would
not only refrain from engaging in socially useful and necessary activities,
but would hesitate to communicate for fear of being sued."
These policy justifications are opposed by a number of legal
commentators who raise different concerns. For instance, to take the
point just made about the impediment to human activity, Bell has argued
that liability for mental harm may create a climate of respect for others'
feelings and this should be encouraged rather than decried. 94 In that sense,
compensating for mental harm amounting to less than an RPI would be
justified.
This type of comment brings to the fore the viewpoints of critical
theorists expressed chiefly through feminist and disability scholarship.
Recognizing the existence of various biases is an essential step in the
process of determining if and how mental harm claims should be contained.
For instance, feminists have long denounced tort law's structural division
between mind and body. This dichotomy creates a hierarchy of values with
physical injury given greater importance and priority than mental harm.95
When physical injury is at the top of the hierarchy of harms, mere distress
probably ranks even lower than an RPI.96 Generally, mental harm is
"devalued because of its cognitive association with women and women's
activities."97 As Chamallas and Wriggins explain "the gender disadvantage
flows from disfavouring the type of claim that women plaintiffs are likely

91. Gregory C Keating, "Emotional Distress as Harm" (Paper delivered at the Obligations VI
Conference, London, Ontario, 20 July 2012 at 23) [unpublished]. This paper does not deal with RPI as
such since this rule does not exist in that form in American law. Rather, the article explores American
tort law's treatment of NIED (negligent infliction of emotional distress), in particular the notion that
the negligent infliction of pure mental harm should be a matter of remoteness rather than duty.
92. Carolyn Sappideen & Prue Vines, eds, Fleming's The Law of Torts, 10th ed (Pyrnont, NSW:
Lawbook Co, 2011) at 175-176; Butler, Damages,supranote 19 at 76-78.
93. Discussed by Teff, supra note 6 at 169.
94. See Bell, supranote 35 at 370-371.
95. See Martha Chamallas, "The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law" (1997-1998)
146 U Pa L Rev 463 at 490-503; Martha Chamallas & Jennifer B Wriggins, The Measure of InjuryRace, Gender and Tort Law (New York: New York University Press, 2010) at 40-41, 90; Law of
Fright,supranote 3; Nicky Priaulx, "Endgame: On Negligence and Reparation for Harm" in Janice
Richardson & Erika Rackley, eds, Feminist Perspectiveson Tort Law (Oxford: Routledge, 2012) 36 at
38-42; Conaghan & Mansell, supra note 2 at 160.
96. Mzdlany & Handford, supranote 6 at 80.
97. Chamallas & Wriggins, supra note 95 at 24; Prue Vines, Mehera San Roque & Emily Rumble,
"Is 'nervous shock' still a feminist issue? The duty of care and psychiatric injury in Australia" (2010)
18 Tort LR 9 at 18-20.
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to bring, thus placing them-and any male plaintiffs who bring similar
claims-at a structural disadvantage."98
From another perspective, scholars have highlighted the persistence
of "stubborn cultural biases" within the judicial process including fear
of mental illnesses and their stigma. 99 The legal system makes many
assumptions which "reflect our fears and apprehensions about mental
disability, the mentally disabled, and the possibility that we may become
mentally disabled." 00
Although research within the field of disability legal studies has not
yet extended to the topic under review in this article, the disability studies
discourse provides powerful arguments to support a more open approach
towards mental disability within tort law.o'0 For instance, disability studies
scholars offer a strong critique of the medical model of disability.'02 This
seems particularly relevant to the topic at hand as one could argue that,
through the recourse to formal classifications such as DSM-IV or the ICD10 and the reliance on the psychiatric profession, tort law's emphasis on
the need to prove an RPI is based on this biomedical model. Disability
98. Chamallas & Wriggins, supranote 95 at 92.
99. Osborne, supra note 14 at 85; Levit, supra note 4 at 175, where the author states: "Emotional
injuries are unsympathetic; mental harms are treated as the idiosyncratic reactions of individuals. The
emotionally injured are viewed as ipso facto emotionally, if not biologically, weaker than the rest of us,
who presumably would have been able to resist the temptation to succumb to an emotional injury. This
attitude is undoubtedly related to the broader paradigm within which society views mental illness." On
the problem of stigmatisation, see Senate of Canada, Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs,
Science and Technology, Out of the Shadows at Last-Transforming Mental Health, Mental Illness
and Addiction Services in Canada(May 2006) at 10-19.
100. Perlin & Dortman, supranote 4 at 47-48. See also JM Ussher, Women r Madness: Misogyny or
Mental Illness? (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1991) at 4, who writes about her
mother's illness: "But we never talk of this time. Perhaps the fear of the madness is still with us, the
shame which we did not know until the secret was made, so that the word 'madness' was never spoken.
Perhaps we fear it will happen to us. That it is 'in our genes.' That one day too our nerves will snap.
That we will crack. That we will split in two, fall in a heap, face the terror head on. That this madness,
now called depression, or schizophrenia, or neurosis, will afflict us, and we will lose control."
101. The field of disability studies is rich with various viewpoints which cannot be given the attention
they deserve here. For a thorough overview of the subject, see Arlene S Kanter, "The Law: What's
Disability Studies Got to Do With It or An Introduction to Disability Legal Studies" (2011) 42
Colum HRL Rev 403. She notes, at 406, that disability studies "offers the law and legal education the
opportunity to critically examine the role of 'normalcy' within the law and within society, generally."
See also Christopher Ralston & Justin Ho, eds, PhilosophicalReflections on Disability (New York:
Springer Verlag, 2010) [Reflections on Disability].
102. This was recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada in Eldridge v British Columbia (Attorney
General), [1997] 3 SCR 624 and in Granovsky v Canada (Minister ofEmployment and Immigration),
[2000] 1 SCR 703. See also Kanter, supra note 101 at 419-421, where the author explains that the
medical model of disability has been greatly criticized as it "places responsibility on the individual to
change or to be 'rehabilitated' or 'cured' in order to fit into society... .The result of relying solely on
[this model].. .is that society ... has no obligation to look at how it, itself, is structured; how it creates
barriers to inclusion; and how it shares in the responsibility to eliminate the legal, attitudinal, and
physical barriers that exclude people with disabilities."
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scholars have explored other models including the "social model" of
disability according to which disability is a social construct and "it is
affirmatively the obligation of society to change or adapt..."103 Schulz
explains that such a social perspective places less emphasis on diagnostic
labels.104 This seems to point to the need for courts to move away from the
RPI formula towards a threshold which could encompass a wider array of
mental harms.' 0
Bias is not the only concern to be noted. Recognizing problems of
access is also important. The law's insistence on proof of an RPI may have
disproportionate effects on vulnerable members of society. Savvy and
well-informed plaintiffs understand the importance of seeking medical
and psychiatric help as soon as possible after a negligent event. They
may be more apt to seek legal advice quickly and to furnish the necessary
retainers to finance the costs of expert reports. This may not be the case for
individuals who live in isolated areas, have no financial means, or are less
informed about the intricacies of the legal process and the importance of
seeking psychiatric help early to strengthen their claims.
In summary, this last set of policy considerations illustrates the
importance of going beyond instrumentalist concerns such as opening
the floodgates of litigation when considering if a limiting device such
as RPI should be retained. The law cannot ignore the important social
ramifications attached to the decision to favour "psychiatric" disorders
103. Kanter, ibid at 428. Other models have been suggested including the minority group model,
the social model and the cultural model. See generally Kanter, ibid and Ann Silvers, "An Essay on
Modeling: The Social Model of Disability" in Reflections on Disability, supra note 101 at 19.
104. Izabela Z Schulz, "Determining Disability: New Advances in Conceptualization and Research"
(2009) 2 Psychol Inj & L 199 at 200 discussing David B Peterson & Heidi Paul, "Using the
International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF) to Conceptualize Disability
and Functioning in Psychological Injury and Law" (2009) 2 Psychol Inj & Law 205.
105. An approach based on disability studies could yield very interesting results as shown by the case
of Plesnerv British Columbia (Hydra and PowerAuthority), 2009 BCCA 188, 95 BCLR (4th) 1 (Ryan
JA dissenting). This was not a tort case but the issue before the court had to do with the threshold of
compensation for stand-alone mental harm in the context of workers compensation legislation and
policy. The requirements for compensation for this type of harm were more stringent than those for
physical injury or for mental harm flowing from a physical injury. The British Columbia Court ofAppeal
found that s 5.1(1)(a) of the Workers Compensation Act, RSBC 1996, c 492 (whereby compensation
for mental stress could only occur "if an acute reaction to a sudden unexpected traumatic event arising
out of and in the course of the worker's employment") when read together with Policy No 13.30
(expanding on the unexpected and traumatic criteria) breached s 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982
(UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter]as it discriminated, on the basis of mental disability, against workers who
suffer stand-alone mental harm. The Court confirmed that the dispositions could not be saved under
sI of the Charter.At para 130 of the decision, the Court took into account contextual factors such as
the fact that persons with mental disabilities "are subjected to pre-existing disadvantage, stereotyping,
prejudice and vulnerability." The Court also noted that the scheme reinforced negative messages about
pure mental harm, at para 152.
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over lesser forms of mental harm. In the early 1970s, when the phrase
"RPI" first found its way into Canadian jurisprudence, 106 courts may not
have been able to appreciate some of these repercussions, but more than
forty years later, they can no longer ignore them.
III. Redefining negligence law's approach to the nature of actionable
mental harm
How should Canadian negligence law deal with the nature of actionable
mental harm? Informed by the policy justifications discussed above, this
section explores options ranging from the removal of thresholds altogether
to the adoption of formulas other than the current insistence on the need
to prove an RPI.
To fully appreciate the range of possible responses, it is useful to recall
that the need for an RPI is almost always mentioned in conjunction with
the rule that there can be no compensation for "mere upsets or distress."'o7
Thus, the orthodox view treats mental harm as an either/or proposition: in
order to recover damages for a mental injury that does not manifest itself
physically, a plaintiff must establish that the harm goes beyond emotions
that are part and parcel of human life and is, in fact, an RPI.o' The
assumption that the "no compensation for mere upsets" lower threshold
necessarily calls for proof of an RPI must be rejected in favour of a
tripartite conception of harm intensity. According to this approach, mere
distress is the lower threshold, RPI the higher limit and, in the mid-range,
there are harms amounting to more than mere fleeting emotions but less
than conditions recognized by the formal classifications. The thresholds
envisaged below move along this scale. Their respective merit is assessed
in light of the policy considerations outlined above.
1. Unlimited actionablemental harm
Eliminating all thresholds pertaining to the nature of actionable mental
harm is an option worth exploring.o' This would involve removing not
106. Canadian courts have repeatedly relied on the English case of Hinz v Berry, [1970] 2 QB 40,
[197011 All ER 1074 (CA) as the source for this phrase. See Bdlanger-Hardy, "Reconsidering," supra
note 18, for a thorough discussion of the case and the suggestion that the decision may not be as clear
a precedent as previously thought.
107. Early statements of this rule are discussed in Mendelson, supranote 8 at 29-35.
108. Mulheron, supra note 19, describes this threshold as the "Traditional Rule" at 78.
109. See Bell, supra note 35, who examines this option in the context of American tort law and
on a wider scale, as he considers the removal of all barriersto compensation for mental harm for
indirect plaintiffs (or bystanders) except the need to prove the foreseeability of "psychic" injury. He
argues, at 335, that this "full recovery rule would serve the goal of reducing overall accident costs
more satisfactorily than do the present liability rules." His article sparked a lively debate: Richard N
Pearson, "Liability for Negligently Inflicted Psychic Harm: A Response to Professor Bell" (1984) 36
U Fla L Rev 413 and Peter A Bell, "Reply to a Generous Critic" (1984) 36 U Fla L Rev 437.
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only the RPI limit but also the "no compensation for mere upsets" lower
threshold leaving plaintiffs free to seek redress before the courts without
regard to the intensity of the harm suffered. Although not articulated
in detail, this may have been what was envisaged in McDermott where
Southin J. considered "scars on the mind" as equivalent to "scars on the
flesh,"" 0 and in Mason where Molloy J. suggested that minor distresses
could be deterred by the award of low damages and frivolous claims and
cost sanctions."'
Removing barriers to actionable mental harm would have practical
advantages. In relevant cases, plaintiffs could choose to substantiate
their claim with medical experts' testimony if they wished, but proof
of concordance with the classifications' diagnostic criteria would not
be necessary. Lower administrative costs may follow, especially where
complex psychiatric opinion would otherwise have been required to deal
with borderline cases. More importantly, the rules regarding mental harm
would be brought in line with those applying to physical harm (where
minor injuries attract minor damages), thereby avoiding the need to make
"elusive and arguably artificial" distinctions between physical and mental
injury, a goal specifically recognized by the Supreme Court in Mustapha.1 2
A strong argument supporting the removal of limits on the nature
of actionable harm is the absence of this type of control device in many
other contexts of tort law." For instance, damages are regularly awarded
for the "suffering" component of non-pecuniary losses flowing from
physical injuries. Also, a number of torts-assault, false imprisonment,
and even malicious prosecution, for example-allow damages for mental
harm without imposing limits based on its intensity.114 Granted these are
intentional wrongs, where the stakes may be different;"' nevertheless the
common law has been able to accommodate these claims for centuries
without unduly burdening the judicial system. The intrinsic elements of

110. Supra note 49 at 53.
Ill. Supra note 10 at 381-382.
112. Supra note 12 at para 8.
113. See McDermott, supra note 49 at 53, per Southin J.
114. For a good survey of this question see Giliker,supranote 6 and Mullany & Handford,supra note
6 at 82-92.
115. Giliker, supra note 6 at 39, points out that "courts' disapproval of intentional conduct overrides
the concerns of indeterminate liability." She argues that damages should be awarded "(a) where mental
distress is consequential on physical injury resulting from a tort, and (b) generally in addition to
ordinary compensation for torts committed intentionally and/or actionable per se." She would not
extend recovery to negligently caused stand-alone mental harm.
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these intentional torts have helped to contain the number of claims,"'6
something which can also occur in the case of negligence as plaintiffs
must prove the various elements of the tort, often a difficult task as seen
in Mustapha. Indeed, the need to prove proximate cause, especially the
foreseeability of mental harm in a person of reasonable fortitude can
represent a formidable obstacle to the recovery of damages. The same can
be said about negligence's other components such as factual causation.
While removing all thresholds of actionable mental harm can be
defended on a number of levels, objections can be anticipated especially
from those concerned by the danger of proliferation of actions-even if the
argument has been largely discredited. Refusing to admit that a measure
such as the removal of all thresholds has the potential of widening the
pool of claimants would be myopic. As discussed above, however, the
development of clear jurisprudential trends regarding both liability rules
and procedural control devices such as motions to strike unmeritorious
actions should tamper floodgates fears."7
There is another concern, however. The abandonment of all thresholds,
especially the "no compensation for mere upsets" lower threshold, could
lead to the perception that negligence actions are possible even for the
most insignificant, short-lived, minor mental discomforts. Should the
law insist on de minimis mental harm as a condition of compensation? In
Mustapha, the Supreme Court has taken a clear stance on this issue and
has answered in the affirmative." 8 Even scholars writing from a critical

116. Battery requires that the offensive contact with the person of another depart from generally
accepted social conduct, while assault demands that the apprehension of physical contact be reasonable:
see Klar, supra note 14 at 44, 47-48. Recently, in Jones v Tsige, 2012 ONCA 32, 118 OR (3rd) 241,
the Ontario Court of Appeal recognized a new right of action for "intrusion upon seclusion" a form
of invasion of personal privacy. The Court defined the elements of the new tort and discussed the
issue of harm. After noting, at para 71, that "proof of harm to a recognized economic interest is not an
element of the cause of action," the Court explained, at para 71, that damages were to be measured by a
"modest conventional sum." A monetary threshold of $20,000 was proposed. In calculating damages,
the Court stated, at para 87, that regard should be had to factors such as the nature of the offensive act,
its effect on the health, welfare, social, business or financial position of the plaintiff, the relationship
between the parties, the distress, annoyance or embarrassment suffered by the plaintiff or his family,
and finally the conduct of the defendant after the violation of privacy.
117. The combination of these various devices has proven very efficient in limiting negligently
inflicted mental harm claims in Canada. For instance, since the year 2000, successful plaintiffs
defending claims for compensation for stand-alone mental harm have rarely been successful before
Canadian appellate courts. This is mainly due to control mechanisms other than the RPI threshold.
One successful case is Frazer, supra note 7. In that case, the mental harm (which was clearly an
RPI) was considered foreseeable in a person of reasonable fortitude. It must be noted however that
the psychiatric illness the plaintiff suffered was directly linked to his physical harm (an injury to his
ankle). Thus, one could query whether there was "stand-alone" mental harm in that case. See supra
note 7 for the importance of this distinction.
118. Supra note 12 at para 9.
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perspective recognize that limits to liability are necessary as long as they
are not biased." Perhaps the key lies in the intuition that tort law cannot
compensate for all harms and that limited resources are best dedicated to
the compensation of mental suffering which crosses at least a minimal
threshold. This consideration creates enough hesitation about the outright
abandoning of all thresholds of actionable mental harm to warrant the
examination of other less drastic options.
2. Exploring limitations on actionablemental harm
If the option of removing all thresholds is not retained, the challenge is to
choose where to draw the line along the spectrum of mental harm intensity.
a. Discardingthe RPI higher threshold
Should the RPI threshold continue to be part of Canadian law? Apart from
the policy justifications discussed above-predictability and containment
of claim proliferation in particular-one could argue that if categories of
psychiatric injury are set to expand (for example, if grief is eventually
included in the DSM-5) more plaintiffs will fit within the RPI label
thus widening, indirectly, the scope of compensable injury. Similarly, if
advances in neuroscience make it easier to document the physiological
basis of mental harm, more plaintiffs will be able to convince courts that
their condition has a "physical component" and is therefore compensable.
Waiting for the gradual inclusion of mental disorders in the DSM-5 or for
the evolution of neuroscience is neither a practical way of dealing with the
problems associated with the current state of the law, nor does it provide
a satisfactory principled answer to the policy concerns discussed above.
For those who cling to the RPI criterion on the basis of predictability,
the inherent limits of the classification systems, the debates within the
psychiatric profession and the continuing evolution of knowledge about
mental health should be sufficient to dispel any assurance that such a goal
can be met. Furthermore, because of this uncertainty, there is no evidence
that this particular higher limit is more efficient at containing the number
of claims and the costs of litigation than would be a less demanding
threshold.' 20
Ultimately, the criterion unfairly excludes those who fail to access
psychiatric care and discards as unworthy of compensation other forms
of mental harm that can be as debilitating as those closely associated with

119. See, e.g., Chanallas & Wriggins, supra note 95 at 91.
120. See Bell, supranote 35 at 377 et seq.
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the formal diagnostic criteria found in the classifications.12' As argued
elsewhere,122 Mustapha did not endorse the RPI rule as it is applied today
by Canadian courts-moreover, the jurisprudential footings of the rule
are not particularly solid.123 Keeping in mind all these considerations,
Canadian courts should abandon the RPI limit.
b. Whither the "seriousandprolonged"formula?
Following Mustapha, a number of plaintiffs argued that the Supreme Court
had replaced the RPI threshold with a new criterion. 12 4 According to this
view, compensation for stand-alone mental harm would be possible if the
injury sustained was "serious and prolonged." 25 Although this is probably
not the correct interpretation of the decision,126 examining the workability
of a formula more flexible than the RPI requirement is worthwhile.
At the outset, the "serious and prolonged" test seems attractive because
the dependence on the diagnostic criteria found in the DSM-IV or the
ICD- 10 is reduced. In Kotai, however, the Court expressed reservations
about the formula as it did not "provide a particularly helpful benchmark
for the court, lawyers or litigants." 2 1 More specifically, the problem of
measuring the seriousness of the psychological illness was raised. Would
it be by reference to the impact of the mental harm on the emotional state
or feelings of the plaintiff, by reference to the consequences of the mental
harm on the plaintiff's ability to pursue usual activities, or by reference to
other factors or combination of factors?'28 These questions illustrate some
of the drawbacks of the criterion and the danger that courts may be led
back to relying on the classification systems.
Even if establishing the "serious" nature of mental harm would prove
difficult, the second prong of the formula would be even more problematic
because insistence on "prolonged" mental harm excludes serious but short121. Mason, supra note 10 at 380; Nicholas J Mullany & Peter R Handford, "Moving the Boundary
Stone by Statute-The Law Commission on Psychiatric Illness" (1999) 22 UNSW LJ 350 at 369;
Butler, Damages, supra note 19 at 68. See also Grey, supra note 54 at 224, who supports the
introduction of the RPI threshold in American law. She recognizes that imposing a higher threshold
(RPI rather than "negligent infliction of emotional distress" (NIED) which is the terminology retained
in the United States) would impose "a higher threshold requirement which could eliminate recovery
for mental effects that do not amount to medical disorders, a more restrictive approach than that of the
Restatement."
122. B6langer-Hardy, "Reconsidering," supranote 18.
123. Ibid.
124. See, Kotal SR, supra note 25 and Healey, supra note 15.
125. Mustapha, supra note 12 at para 9.
126. B6langer-Hardy, "Reconsidering," supra note 18 where it is argued the phrase "serious and
prolonged" simply provided another way of defining the lower "mere upset" threshold.
127. Supra note 25 at para 67.
128. Ibid.
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lived illnesses. Justifying why serious mental harm of short duration is less
worthy of compensation than serious mental harm of longer duration is
very difficult and, inevitably, would lead to unfair results.
If the adoption of "serious and prolonged" threshold was envisaged in
Canada, consideration of the position in the United States might be prudent
even if the particular evolution of American tort law makes comparisons
difficult. In that country, claims for the negligent infliction of emotional
distress (NIED) do not require proof of an RPI. Instead, courts have
relied on other standards such as the "physical manifestations" criterion,
a formula eventually replaced, in some States, by qualitative requirements
such as "serious," "serious, genuine and reasonable," or quantitative
requirements such as "significant" or "substantial."' 2 Section 46 of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts relies on the phrase "serious emotional
disturbance."' 3 0 Delving into the details of American law goes beyond
the scope of the present article, but the American experience seems to
confirm that qualifiers such as "serious" and "prolonged" may oblige
courts to create numerous distinctions which can be as problematic as the
RPI criterion.
c. Exploring other limitingformulas
Alternatives to the RPI rule have not been discussed often but the few
scholars who have ventured to study the subject have made interesting
suggestions which are worth examining in some detail.'"' The solutions
offered by Teff and Butler are discussed in this section while the more
recent work of Mulheron is considered in the next part as it is closer to
what will ultimately be recommended in this article.

129. The nature of actionable harm is not the only element considered by the courts. For instance,
in the case of direct NIED, section 46 of the Restatement provides that liability follows only if the
defendant "a) places the other in immediate danger of bodily harm and the emotional disturbance
results from the danger; or b) occurs in the course of specified categories of activities, undertakings, or
relationships in which negligent conduct is especially likely to cause serious emotional disturbance,"
infra note 130. For a description of the evolution of American law see WP Keeton et al, Prosser &
Keeton on Torts, 5th ed (St Paul, MN: West Publishing, 1984) at 359-367; Grey, supra note 54 at
206-212; Narbeh Baddasarian, "A Prescription for Mental Distress: The Principles of Psychosomatic
Medicine with the Physical Manifestation Requirement in N.I.E.D. Cases" (2000) 26 Am J of L
& Medicine 401, arguing that courts should insist on the physical manifestations requirement thus
allowing them to supplement their analysis with tenets of the doctrine of psychosomatic disorders;
Mullany & Hanford,supra note 6 at 89-90.
130. American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law Third, Torts: Liability for Physical and
Emotional Harm, vol 1 (Philadelphia: American Law Institute, 2009) §4.
131. Only comprehensive proposals with a strong focus on actionable mental harm are reviewed here,
which is not to say that other suggestions for reform may not be of interest. See, e.g., Campbell &
Montigny, supranote 19 at 153-155 (neutral observer test).
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After his thorough analysis of all the factors limiting compensation
for mental harm, Teff makes a proposal for the reform of English law
which includes a component on actionable mental harm. 3 2 Of note is the
fact that he recommends a "moderately severe mental or emotional harm"
threshold and imposes a uniform minimum monetary threshold to exclude
both physical and mental minor, transient harms.3 3 Giving due attention to
the proposal's second prong goes beyond the scope of this work and will
have to be left to another context. The suggestion to rely on a "moderately
severe mental or emotional harm" threshold is, however, directly related
to the present inquiry.
In promoting this threshold, Teff argues that courts would "assess
the reality and value of the injury in terms of its relative severity, taking
numerous relevant variables into account."' 34 He maintains that courts are
familiar with the process of assessing the severity of harm as this is what
they must currently do when considering non pecuniary losses flowing
from physical harm or from compensable mental harm (if there is an RPI).
Psychiatric evidence would not be excluded but there would be a greater
role for other mental health professionals such as clinical psychologists.13 1
Perhaps the key question to ask when considering Teff's proposal is
whether the threshold he advocates would attract the same concerns as
those outlined above in the discussion of the "serious and prolonged" test.
What would "moderately severe mental or emotional harm" encompass?
The word "moderately" is quite vague and the word "severe," defined
as "grievous" and "extreme,""' may lead courts to a line of analysis
very similar to the one they take when they apply the RPI threshold.
Nevertheless, Teff's intimation that the inquiry about actionable mental
harm should call upon a wider variety of health professionals is welcomed
as is his proposal to include a wider spectrum of mental conditions.
Butler's reform proposal is grounded in the medical research on trauma
and its consequences, in particular on Mardi Horowitz's stress response

132. Supra note 6 at 185 where he summarizes his full proposal for reform. Apart from the two
elements mentioned above, his plan includes: abolishing the primary/secondary divide (of lesser
interest in Canada since, for the moment at least, this dichotomy has not been endorsed by Canadian
courts), relying on the standard negligence principles of reasonable care, reasonable foreseeability and
causation for all cases, and creating two categories of damages for non-pecuniary losses: severe and
moderately severe.
133. Ibid at 8-9, 177-178.
134. Ibid at 178.
135. Ibid.
136. The Oxford English Dictionary,2d ed, sub verbo "severe."
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theory.137 Butler suggests a two-prong formula whereby compensable
mental harm would require evidence of a failure to return to a "psychiatric
homeostatic equilibrium" which "adversely affects the plaintiff's normal
enjoyment of life.""' The advantages envisaged here are the exclusion of
mere upsets from the sphere of compensatory harm and the focus on the
impact of the negligent conduct on the plaintiff rather than on concordance
with the classifications' diagnostic criteria. Butler explains that assessing
the normal enjoyment of life would be similar to what courts already do
when they consider non pecuniary losses."'
The merit of Butler's proposal lies in his serious and thoughtful
attempt to ground the threshold of actionable mental harm in developing
knowledge on trauma and its effects. Realistically, however, it seems
unlikely that Canadian courts would embrace an esoteric phrase such as
"psychiatric homeostatic equilibrium" in lieu of the RPI formula. This
being said, the second prong of Butler's proposal, With its emphasis on
the consequences of a negligent act on the injured plaintiff, is of interest
especially given that input beyond psychiatric evidence is envisaged. This
point, also highlighted by Teff, is considered in the next section.
3. The "no compensationfor mere upsets" lower threshold: a limit
endorsed in Mustapha
Exploring the limits ofactionable mental harm requires a closer examination
of the rule whereby a plaintiff cannot be compensated for "disagreeable
disturbance of emotional or mental tranquility." 40 This lower threshold
was explained by the Supreme Court in Mustapha as follows: "[t]he law
does not recognize upset, disgust, anxiety, agitation and other mental states
that fall short of injury... [rising] above the ordinary annoyances, anxieties
and fears that people living in society routinely, if sometimes reluctantly,
accept.. .Quite simply, minor and transient upsets do not constitute
personal injury."141 Similar formulations of the rule have been part of
Canadian law for over 100 years. 4 2 A useful way to express how would
work a reform proposal based on this threshold is to follow Thomas J.'s
suggestion to frame the scope of compensable injury negatively: damages

137. MJ Horowitz, "Stress-Response Syndromes: A Review of Posttraumatic Stress and Adjustment
Disorders" in JP Wilson & B Raphael, eds, InternationalHandbook of Traumatic Stress Syndromes
(New York: Plenum Press, 1993) 49. See Butler, Damages,supranote 19 at 8-12.
138. Ibid at 138-139.
139. Ibid at 139.
140. This is the expression used by Mullany & Handford,supra note 6 at 56.
141. Supra note 12 at para 8 (emphasis by the Court).
142. See Armsworth v South-EasternRailway Co (1847), 11 Jur 758 for an early British case and, in
Canada, Miner, supra note 11 at 421 (quoting Dulieu, supra note 10 at 673).
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may be recovered for stand-alone mental harm unless such harm is "of the
kind which is part of ordinary human experience."' 43
In her well-articulated article, Mulheron argues in favour of keeping
the "no compensation for mere upsets" limit while discarding the RPI
requirement. She explains that a court would no longer ask "whether the
claimant has suffered a psychiatric illness identified in ICD-10 or DSMIV, but whether the claimant has suffered some abnormal psychological
reaction, as opposed to ordinary human emotions of grief, distress, etc.,
to constitute actionable damage."' 44 Her proposal differs, however, from
what is suggested in the present article in that she would nevertheless
retain a higher limit-a "grievous mental harm" threshold-to replace the
RPI formula.'4 5 To assist courts with the task of delineating the actionable
harm, Mulheron points to the use of objective factors such as "how
seriously the claimant's cognitive functions and participation in daily
activities was impaired, post negligence; the length of time for which the
impairment was suffered; and/or the extent of medical care required by the
claimant."' 4 6 Although these questions do not necessarily require reliance
on the classifications, establishing the extent to which cognitive functions
and participation in daily activities have been impaired or determining if
the harm amounts to "grievous mental harm" may be quite challenging and
would more than likely require psychiatric testimony. In addition, wording
such as "grievous," a term denoting a serious injury," is quite vague and
its strict interpretation may lead to the exclusion of meritorious claims.
This is why the solution proposed in the present article focuses only on the
lower threshold: all mental harm amounting to more than "mere upsets"
would be actionable.
The option of keeping only the lower threshold is closest to the
Supreme Court's intention in Mustapha."1In its decision, the Court did not
endorse the RPI threshold as it is presently understood in Canadian law,
but chose instead to emphasize the notion that compensable harm must
amount to more than mere upsets of life. This manner of characterising
the nature of actionable harm is in line with the Court's intimation that

143. Van Soest, supranote 51 at para 97.
144. Mulheron, supra note 19 at 91.
145. Ibid. Mulheron does not work with the tripartite approach adopted in this article. Her position is
that a plaintiff cannot claim for mere upsets and must therefore prove grievous mental harm in order
to be compensated.
146. Ibid at 109.
147. The Oxford English Dictionary,2d ed, sub verbo "grievous."
148. This interpretation of Mustaphais developed in more detail in B6langer-Hardy, "Reconsidering,"
supranote 18.
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it "would not purport to define compensable injury exhaustively." 49 The
correct interpretation of Mustapha, therefore, confirms the Supreme
Court's preference for this approach' and lower courts must simply be
encouraged to reorient their traditional stance on the issue. Interestingly, in
the context of recent negotiated settlements,"' modest damages have been
awarded for harm amounting to less than an RPI, perhaps indicating that,
in practice, accommodating a variety of mental harm claims is not only
possible but acceptable to the insurance industry.
Insisting on a lower threshold of actionable mental harm based on the
exclusion of insignificant or trivial emotional upsets would assuage, at
least in part, fears of unlimited liability as the lower end of the potential
pool of claimants would be circumscribed. In addition the proposed
reform would respond to some extent to the need for predictability by
providing a guideline on the intensity of mental harm likely to be accepted
by courts. On a normative level, the existence of a de minimis threshold
would signal that the law does not protect against claims for insignificant
or trivial momentary upsets and that people living in a complex society
must bear the costs of this type of inconvenience even if it flows from
negligent conduct.
As noted above, the debate about the nature of actionable mental harm
raises concerns about overdependence on the diagnostic criteria listed in
classification systems such as DSM-IV or ICD-10 and the inherent limits
of such diagnostic instruments. Mulheron argues that eliminating the need
to prove a RPI would make this reliance "less significant."' 2 Although this

149. Supra note 12 at para 8.
150. The language used in Mustapha is very similar to the Supreme Court's reasoning in New
Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v G(J), [1999] 3 SCR 46, a case dealing
with a parent's right to state-funded counsel in cases of custody suspension by the State. The Court
concluded, at para 58, that a parent's right to security under s 7 of the Charter,supranote 105, includes
physical and psychological integrity, and that this protection goes beyond the criminal law to include
child protection proceedings. The Court wrote at para 59-60: "It is clear that the right to security of
the person does not protect the individual from the ordinary stresses and anxieties that a person of
reasonable sensibility would suffer as a result of government action...For a restriction of security of
the person to be made out, then, the impugned state action must have a serious and profound effect on
a person's psychological integrity. The effects of the state interference must be assessed objectively,
with a view to their impact on the psychological integrity of a person of reasonable sensibility. This
need not rise to the level of nervous shock or psychiatric illness, but must be greater than ordinary
stress or anxiety."
151. See Kotai v The Queen of the North, 2010 BCSC 1180, [2010] BCJ No 1645. The settlement of
this class action was negotiated considering the difficulty for many claimants to prove that they had
reached the RPI threshold. Individuals who, in their counsel's opinion, were considered to have been
merely "upset" by the event received $500 as recognition of the harm suffered "even though it was
unlikely that the court would award damages." Others, who were identified as having "apparently
compensable claims," received larger amounts based on a prior third party assessment.
152. Supra note 19 at 95.
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seems correct, it is important to recognize that dependence on psychiatric
testimony would not disappear altogether as courts may need assistance to
separate non compensable emotional upsets from compensable emotional
harm.
Drawing the line at mere upsets rather than at an RPI, or at grievous
or severe harm, would have the advantage of reducing dependence on
the classifications' diagnostic criteria as well as on the medical model of
mental harm assessment in general. If necessary, a plaintiff's case could be
based on the clinical judgment of a psychiatrist, a psychologist or a family
physician but, in less complicated cases, the difference between mere
upsets and compensable mental harm could be determined in much the
same way as the notion of "contact" is handled within the tort of battery.
In that context, courts have to establish that the offensive or harmful
interference to the person is "beyond the trivial contact that is expected
in the course of ordinary life."' 53 Distinguishing between mere upsets and
actionable mental harm would be based on a flexible approach which is
what Teff, Butler, and Mulheron have all advocated-albeit in slightly
different ways. This flexibility, in combination with the lower threshold,
may also address some of the wider social concerns identified above: for
instance, problems of lack of access to mental health specialists would not
be as crucial to the success of a claim.
Although relying on the lower threshold of "no compensation for
mere upsets" may not respond perfectly to all the policy concerns noted
above, the proposal provides a workable model which answers the main
criticisms of the traditional RPI limit. Of course, dispelling the impression
that, initially, the number of claims may increase is impossible but this
fear must be resisted and recognition given to the procedural measures
and substantive limits which will contain unmeritorious claims. Indeed,
the proposed changes must not be viewed in isolation. In Mustapha, the
Supreme Court has laid out the other rules which currently apply to claims
for mental harm and, for the moment at least, these are unlikely to change
dramatically. In that context, the Court's flexible approach regarding the
issue of actionable mental harm should be fully embraced.
Conclusion
This article endeavoured to respond to the interest recently generated
for the notion of actionable mental harm following the Mustapha
decision and its aftermath, in particular the need to prove an RPI, one
of the mechanisms devised by common law courts to control the ambit
153. Linden & Feldthusen, supra note 14 at 42.
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of liability for negligently caused stand-alone mental harm. The inquiry
focussed specifically on the policies underlying the difficult decision of
setting the line of demarcation of compensable harm along the spectrum of
possible mental reactions to a negligent act. The study highlighted many
interacting concerns based either on plaintiffs' behaviour and attitude,
pragmatic and evidentiary issues including the reliance on classifications
such as DSM-IV-TR and ICD-10, fear of proliferation of claims, and wider
social expectations and values about mental harm.
A critical look at these concerns revealed that some of the perceived
advantages of the RPI rule, in particular predictability, were debatable
if not illusory. Moreover, insistence on the traditional formula raised
issues of access and fairness towards plaintiffs who, while suffering
significant mental harm, were unable to show the necessary concordance
between their condition and the diagnostic criteria outlined in well-known
classifications.
After surveying various proposals for reform, a model based on a "no
compensation for mere upsets" threshold was evaluated and adopted as
it appeared most apt to strike the correct balance between deterring legal
actions based on "mere upsets" of life and recognizing the legitimacy of
"mid-spectrum" mental harm occurring after a negligent act. Under the
proposed model, legal actors are encouraged to differentiate between
mere upsets and actionable harm through a flexible approach based
on a pragmatic assessment of evidence provided by a variety of health
professionals and other social actors.
Although the proposal may not eliminate the problem of "broad,
culturally influenced assumptions about mental disability and about
what it means to be ordinary,"' 5 4 the hope is that by embracing a broader
conception of actionable mental harm, Canadian courts will acknowledge
the inequities created by the current rules. Indeed, the most compelling
policy considerations discussed above revolve around mental health and
society's attitude towards mental disability and the social groups most
likely to suffer from its effects. As noted by Chamallas and Wriggins,
nowadays "outside the realm of law, the state of a person's emotional and
relational life is regarded as central to that person's well-being." 55 The
very notion of emotional health and well-being is debated in the fields of
psychology and other social sciences where interesting and fascinating
links between legal rules and knowledge about emotional harms and

154. Foster, supra note 5 at 65.
155. Chamallas & Wriggins, supranote 95 at 90.
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their impact on well-being are explored.1 6 Of course, more research is
required on topics of this nature. In this exciting climate, with mental
health being pushed to the fore of public and social consciousness like
never before,'1 7 21st century Canadian tort law simply cannot trail behind.
Shedding the RPI requirement would be an important first step towards the
modernization of the law on mental harm.

156. See, e.g., David DePianto, "The Hedonic Impact of Stand-Alone Emotional Harms: An Analysis
of Survey Data" (2012) Law & Psychology Rev 115 [forthcoming], online: <http://ssm.com/
abstract-2111734>. The article can best be summarized by quoting from its conclusion, at 141: "a
range of emotional harms that might be subject to dismissal in courts-including stand-alone claims
of emotional distress-bear a significant impact on SWB [subjective well-being]. To the extent that the
unequal treatment of physical and emotional harms is based not upon practical concerns but upon the
belief that mental health is less important to the quality of life the findings presented [in DePianto's
study] challenge the distinctions currently drawn in tort law."
157. Consider for instance the work of the Mental Health Commission of Canada, online: MHCC
<http://www.mentalhealthcommission.calenglish/pages/default.aspx>. The Commission, created in
2007, has developed a mental health strategy for Canada: see Health Commission of Canada, Toward
Recovery & Well-Being-A Frameworkfor a Mental Health Strategy for Canada (Mental Health
Commission, 2009).

